Vedanta-Sutras Part I · 98 of 103

Adhyaya II: Pada II: Sutras 23-25

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that ‘whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrita) and momentary.’ To the triad there mentioned they give the names ‘cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,’ ‘cessation not dependent on such an act,’ and ‘space.’ This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhâvamâtra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By ‘cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,’ we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1; by ‘cessation not so dependent’ is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2; by ‘space’ is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences ‘space’ will be refuted later on (Sûtra 24), the two other ones are refuted in the present Sûtra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, ‘on account of the absence of interruption.’ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series.—The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted 3.—The latter alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence 1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interruption.—For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

Footnotes 410:1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.

410:2 I. e. the insensible continual decay of things.—Viparîta iti pratikshanam ghatâdînâm yuktyâ sâdhyamâno#kusalair avagantum asakyah sûkshmo vinâso#pratisamkhyânirodhah. Brahmâv.

410:3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadarsanasamgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.

411:1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.

23.And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the ‘path’ 2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatisfactory.

Footnotes 411:2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.

24.And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-samkhyâvirodha and aprati°) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, âkâsa).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ‘space sprang from the Self.’—To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.—Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied—there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies 1.—Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ‘On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?’), in which the following question occurs, ‘On what is the air founded?’ to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation.—Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

Footnotes 412:1 What does enable us to declare that there is âvaranâbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.

25.And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhri) also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ‘I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,’ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, ‘I remember; another person made the observation.’ But no such state of consciousness does arise.—When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, ‘I remember that that other person saw that and that.’—

In the case under discussion, however, the Vainâsika himself—whose state of consciousness is, ‘I saw that and that’—knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainâsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only?

Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity.

Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness.—Should it be said that the cognition ‘this is similar to that’ is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. ‘this’ and ‘that’—being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression ‘this is similar to that’

would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of ‘similarity’ only.—Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.—For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.

26.(Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.