The Dance of Shiva · 14 of 14

Individuality, Autonomy and Function

1 The object of government is to make the governed behave as the governors wish. This is true of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ govern- ment alike, and alike of the rule of a conqueror, of a hereditary monarchy and of majority government by representation. The repudiation of tyranny must ultimately involve a repudia- tion of majority rule. Consider a community of five. It is im- possible to deny that the rule of three, in so far as it affects the other two, is as much an arbitrary constraint as the rule of one affecting the other four. It is very liable to be less intelligent. In any case, however, the rule of three becomes, on the basis of votes, a rule of two: and a majority government will mean the rule of two over three. Inasmuch, however, as each of the five is unique, and ‘one law for the lion and the ox is oppression/ there can be no entirely just solution outside the autonomy of each. This, which is widely admitted to be true for nations, is no less true for individuals. From an existing tyranny it is possible to arrive at an indi- vidual autonomy in two ways. In the first place four of the five may revolt against the arbitrary rule of the one, setting up in place of it the rule of the majority. The remaining two may then assert their ‘right’ of self-determination as against the major- ity. Ultimately each of the five will become autonomous: each, as it were, sitting armed in his own house, prepared to repel the intruder. This may be described as a disintegration sanctioned by the presumed diversity of interests which a pluralistic philoso- phy must assert. Since, however, each still desires to govern (to feel it one’s ‘duty’ to govern is only the same thing in other words), and nothing prevents the exercise of governing powers but fear of resistance, the desire will be translated into action as soon as opportunity affords: and one, or a group of two, three, or four of the five must be regarded as merely awaiting (consciously or 1 Sva-bhdva, sva-rajya, svo-dkarma. I 3 8 INDIVIDUALITY. AUTONOMY AND FUNCTION unconsciously) the favorable moment. In the meantime co- operation for common ends is excluded by mutual suspicion: each of the five will have to exercise all of the functions necessary to the existence of an individual, and only a fraction of the activity of each will be vocational. This is the inevitable conse- quence of resistance, and of that sort of desire to take part in government which finds expression in the demand for votes. The anarchy approached by self-assertion, however justified, is therefore the anarchy of chaos: resistance, however inevitable, can of itself only create an unstable equilibrium, which must tend to reconstitute the status quo ante. The second approach to individual autonomy is through renun- ciation — a repudiation of the will to govern. As we are speaking in terms of time, we must conceive of this idea as originating with one of the five, and spreading to the others. Let us, how- ever, ignore the transition period, and suppose that the idea of government has become, for each- of the five, even more distaste- ful than the idea of being governed. In this situation there is nothing to prevent a recognition of common interests, or co-operation to achieve them (co-operation is not government). This will be an integration founded on the presumed identity of all interests which a monistic philosophy must assert. Neither of the five will expect to receive from any of the others something for nothing: but the principle of mutual aid or co-operation will permit each one to fulfil his own function. Activity will be vocational, that is to say, willing. The anarchy approached by renunciation is thus an anarchy of spontaneity: only a renunciation of the will to govern could create a stable equilibrium. Everyone who believes in the self- determination of national groups is to that extent an anarchist. And while we must acknowledge that a state of entire liberty can never be attained, because the will to govern can never be totally eradicated, nevertheless it can be shown that activity based on anarchic principles may be and often is far more immediately and practically effective than an activity of control. Contrast, for example, the result of granting a large measure of autonomy to the Boers with the consequences of withholding it in Ireland. “The last ideal of a future state/’ says Dmitri Merezhkovski, “can only consist in the creation of new religious forms of thought and aifairs; a new religious synthesis between the in- INDIVIDUALITY. AUTONOMY AND FUNCTION dividual and society, composed of unending love and unending liberty.” Far be it from me to assert that such a millennium could ever be realised. But he who knows not whither he saileth knows not which is a fair or a foul wind for him. It cannot be unwise to shape our course towards the desired haven. So much, at least, is possible to every individual: and only he is an individualist in truth, who does not will to govern any other than himself. The ‘will to govern’ must not be confused with the ‘will to power/ The will to govern is the will to govern others: the will to power is the will to govern oneself. Those who would be free should have the will to power without the will to govern. If. such as these are chosen to advise the executive, which cannot be entirely dispensed with, this should tend to the greatest degree of freedom and justice practically possible. Certain of these essays now rewritten first appeared in the Burlington Maga- zine, the Athenaeum, the Modern Re- view, the Musical Quarterly, the Socio- logical Review and the Modern School Magazine.