All the Works of Epictetus · 7 of 100

Book I, Chapter 5

1.If any one opposes very evident Truths, it is not easy to find a Reason which may persuade him, to alter his Opinion. This arises neither from his own Strength, nor from the Weakness of his Teacher: but when, after being driven upon an Absurdity, he becomes petrified, how shall we deal with him any longer by Reason?

2.Now there are two Sorts of Petrifaction: The one, a Petrifaction of the Understanding; the other, of the Sense of Shame, when a Person hath obstinately set himself not to assent to evident Truths, nor to quit the Defence of Contradictions. We all dread a bodily Mortification; and would make use of every Contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a Mortification in the Soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the Soul, when a Person is so affected, as not to apprehend or understand any thing, we think him in a sad Condition: but where the Sense of Shame and Modesty is under an absolute Mortification, we go so far, as even to call this, Strength of Mind.

3.Are you certain that you are awake? —— “I am not (replies such a Person): for neither am I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to myself to be awake.” —— Is there no Difference, then, between these Appearances? —— “None.” —— Shall I argue with this Man any longer? For what Steel or what Caustic can I apply, to make him sensible of his Mortification? He is sensible of it: and pretends not to be so. He is even worse than dead. Doth not he see the Repugnancy of contradictory Propositions? He sees it; and is never the better. He is neither moved, nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worse Condition: his Sense of Shame and Modesty is utterly extirpated. His reasoning Faculty indeed is not extirpated; but turned wild and savage. Shall I call this, Strength of Mind? By no means: unless we allow it be such in the vilest Debauchées, publickly to speak and act whatever comes into their Heads.