All the Works of Epictetus · 54 of 100

Book II, Chapter 22

1.To whatever Objects a Person devotes his Attention, these Objects he, probably, loves. Do Men ever devote their Attention then, to Evils? —— By no means. —— Or even to what doth not concern them? —— No: nor this. —— It remains then, that Good must be the sole Object of their Attention; and, if of their Attention, of their Love too. Whoever, therefore, understands Good, is capable likewise of Love: and he who cannot distinguish Good from Evil, and Things indifferent from both, how is it possible, that he can love? The prudent Person alone then, is capable of loving.

How so? I am not this prudent person, yet I love my Child.

I protest it surprizes me, that you should, in the first place, confess yourself imprudent. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the Use of your Senses? Do not you distinguish the Appearances of Things? Do not you provide such Food, and Cloathing, and Habitation, as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess, that you want Prudence? In truth, because you are often struck, and disconcerted by Appearances, and their Speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same Things to be good, then evil, and, lastly, neither: and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from hence, that you confess yourself imprudent? And are you not changeable too in Love? Riches, Pleasure, in short, the very same Things, you at some times esteem good, and at others, evil: and do not you esteem the same Persons too, alternately good and bad? And, at one time, treat them with Kindness, at another, with Enmity? One time, commend, and at another, censure them?

Yes. This too is the Case, with me.

Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his Friend, think you?

No, surely.

Or doth he, who loves him with a changeable Affection, bear him genuine Good-will?

Nor he, neither.

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him?

Nor he.

Do you not often see little Dogs caressing, and playing with each other, that you would say, nothing could be more friendly: but, to learn what this Friendship is, throw a Bit of Meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a Bit of an Estate, betwixt you and your Son, and you will see, that he will quickly wish you under Ground, and you him: and then you, no doubt, on the other hand, will exclaim; What a Son have I brought up! He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty Girl, and the old Fellow and the young one will, both, fall in Love with her: or let Fame or Danger intervene, the Words of the Father of Admetus will be yours:

You hold Life dear: Doth not your Father too?

Do you suppose, that he did not love his own Child, when he was a little one? That he was not in Agonies, when he had a Fever; and often wished to undergo that Fever in his stead? But, after all, when the Trial comes home, you see what Expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same Mother, and of the same Father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and sleep, together? Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the Paradoxes, which Philosophers utter about Love. And yet, when a Kingdom, like a Bit of Meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say, and how eagerly they wish to kill each other. For universally, be not deceived, no Animal is attached to any thing so strongly, as to its own Interest. Whatever therefore, appears a Hindrance to that, be it Brother, or Father, or Child, or Mistress, or Friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for, by Nature, it loves nothing like its own Interest. This is Father, and Brother, and Family, and Country, and God. Whenever therefore, the Gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their Statues, and burn their Temples; as Alexander ordered the Temple of Esculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the Man he loved.

2.Whenever therefore, any one makes his Interest to consist in the same thing with Sanctity, Virtue, his Country, Parents, and Friends, all these are secured: but, where-ever they are made to interfere, Friends, and Country, and Family, and Justice itself, all give way, borne down by the Weight of Self-interest. For wherever I and mine are placed, thither must every Animal gravitate. If in Body, that will sway us; if in Choice, that; if in Externals, these. If therefore, I be placed in a right Choice, then only, I shall be a Friend, a Son, or a Father, such as I ought. For, in that Case, it will be for my Interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent, Character; to keep the Relations of Life inviolate. But, if I place my self in one Thing, and Virtue in another, the Doctrine of Epicurus will stand its Ground, That Virtue is nothing, or mere Opinion.

3.From this Ignorance it was, that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other; and the Thebans with both: the Persian King, with Greece; and the Macedonians, with both: and now the Romans, with the Getes. And, in still remoter Times, the Trojan War arose from the same Cause. Paris was the Guest of Menelaus; and whoever had seen the mutual Proofs of Good-will, that passed between them, would never have believed, that they were not Friends. But a tempting Bit, a pretty Woman, was thrown in between them; and for this they went to War. At present, therefore, when you see dear Brothers have, in Appearance, but one Soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their Friendship; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. (For the governing Faculty of a bad Man is faithless, unsettled, injudicious; successively vanquished by different Appearances). But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same Parents, and brought up together, and under the same Preceptor; but this Thing only, in what they place their Interest; in Externals, or in Choice. If in Externals, no more call them Friends, than faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even Men, if you are wise. For it is no Principle of Humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other; and take Possession of public Assemblies, as wild Beasts do of Solitudes and Mountains and convert Courts of Justice into Dens of Robbers: nor that prompts them to be intemperate, Adulterers, Seducers; or leads them into other Offences, that Men commit against each other, from the one single Principle, by which they place themselves, and their own Concerns, in Things independent on Choice.

4.But, if you hear, that these Men, in reality suppose Good to be placed only in Choice, and in a right Use of the Appearances of Things; no longer take the trouble of inquiring, if they are Father and Son, or old Companions and Acquaintance; but as boldly pronounce, that they are Friends, as that they are faithful and just. For where else can Friendship be met, but with Fidelity and Modesty, and a Communication of Virtue; and of no other Thing?

Well: but such a one paid me the utmost Regard, for so long a Time; and did not he love me?

How can you tell, Wretch, if that Regard be any other than he pays to his Shoes, or his Horse, when he cleans them? And, how do you know, but when you cease to be a necessary Utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken Stool?

Well: but it is my Wife; and we have lived together many Years.

And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus; and was the Mother of Children, and not a few? But a Bracelet fell in between them. What was this Bracelet? The Principle [she had formed] concerning such Things. This turned her into a savage Animal: this cut asunder all Love; and suffered neither the Wife, nor the Mother, to continue such.

5.Whoever therefore, among you, studies to be, or to gain a Friend, let him cut up all these Principles by the Root; hate them; drive them utterly out of his Soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward Reproaches, and Contests; from Change of Mind, and Self-torment. Then, with respect to others; to every one, like himself, he will be unreserved. To such as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in Points of the greatest Importance: but severe to none; being fully convinced of Plato ‘ s Doctrine, that the Soul is never willingly deprived of Truth. Without all this, you may, in many Respects, live as Friends do; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and be born of the same Parents; and so may Serpents too: but neither they, nor you, can ever be Friends, while you have these brutal and execrable Principles.