All the Works of Epictetus · 43 of 100

Book II, Chapter 11

1.The Beginning of Philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper Way, and by the Door, is a Consciousness of our own Weakness, and Inability, in necessary Things. For we came into the World without any natural Idea of a right-angled Triangle; of a Diesis, or a Hemitone, in Music: but we learn each of these Things by some Instruction of Art. Hence, they who do not understand them, do not form any Conceit of understanding them. But who ever came into the World, without an innate Idea of Good and Evil; Fair and Base; Becoming and Unbecoming; Happiness and Misery; Proper and Improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence we all make use of the Names, and endeavor to apply our Preconceptions to particular Cases. “Such a one hath acted well; not well: right; not right: is unhappy; is happy: is just; is unjust.” Who of us refrains from these Names? Who defers the Use of them, till he had learnt it; as those do, who are ignorant of Lines and Sounds? The Reason of this is, that we come instructed, in some degree, by Nature upon these Subjects; and from this Beginning, we go on to add Self-conceit. “For why, say you, should not I know what Fair and Base is? Have not I the Idea of it?” You have. “Do not I apply this Idea to Particulars?” You do. “Do not I apply it right, then?” Here lies the whole Question; and here arises the Self-conceit. For, beginning from these acknowledged Points, Men proceed to what is in Dispute, by means of their unsuitable Application. For, if they possest a right Method of Application, what would restrain them from being perfect? Now, since you think, that you make a suitable Application, of your Preconceptions, to particular Cases, tell me whence you derive this.

From its seeming so to me.

But it doth not seem so to another: and doth not he too form a Conceit, that he makes a right Application?

He doth.

Is it possible, then, that each of you should apply your Pre-conceptions right, on the very Subjects about which you have contradictory Opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to show us, then, for this Application, preferable to its seeming so to you? And doth a Madman act any otherwise than seems to him, right? Is this then a sufficient Criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come therefore, to something preferable to what seems.

What is that?

2.The Beginning of Philosophy is this: The being sensible of the Disagreement of Men with each other: an Inquiry into the Cause of this Disagreement; and a Disapprobation, and Distrust of what merely seems: a certain Examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly: and an Invention of some Rule, like a Balance, for the Determination of Weights; like a Square, for strait and crooked.

Is this the Beginning of Philosophy, that all Things, which seem right to all Persons, are so?

Why; is it possible, that Contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all Things; but all that seem so to us.

And why more to you, than to the Syrians, or Egyptians? Then to me, or to any other Man?

Not at all more.

3.Therefore [merely] what seems to each Man, is not sufficient to determine the Reality of a Thing. For even in Weights or Measures we are not satisfied with the bare Appearance; but for every thing we find some Rule. And is there, in the present Case then, no Rule, preferable to what seems? Is it possible, that what is of the greatest Necessity in human Life, should be left incapable of Determination and Discovery?

There is, then, some Rule.

And why do we not seek, and discover it; and, when we have discovered, make use of it, without fail, ever after, so as not even to move a Finger, without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their Madness, who make use of no other Measure, but their own perverted Way of Thinking. That afterwards, begin ning from certain known and determinate Points, we may make use of Preconceptions, properly applied to Particulars. What is the Subject that falls under our Inquiry?

Pleasure.

Bring it to the Rule. Throw it into the Scale. Must Good be something in which it is fit to confide? and to which we may trust?

Yes.

Is it fit to trust to any thing unsteady?

No.

Is Pleasure then, a steady Thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the Scale, and drive it far distant from the Place of good Things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one Balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by Good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present Pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a Scale. Thus are Things judged, and weighed, when we have the Rules ready. This is the Part of Philosophy, To examine, and fix the Rules: and to make use of them, when they are known, is the Business of a wise and good Man.